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1. INTRODUCTION 
In many countries the number of people who withdraw from the labor market 
as a consequence of becoming entitled to disability benefits has grown very 
rapidly. In table 1 some key figures are shown for different countries. 
Although a direct comparison is difficult on account of differences in le-
gal structure, eligibility criteria etc. of the disability programs, these 
figures indicate the relative importance of the volume and growth rate of 
disability recipients.1 
Table 1. Key figures with respect to disability programs 
for some selected countries. 
Average annual growth rate The number of disability 
of the number of disability recipients expressed as a 
recipients 1968-1978 percentage of the employed 
1978 
13.0 
11.9 
7.8 
14.7 
11.0a 
Netherlands 
Sweden 
United Kingdom 
United States 
West Germany 
11.3 
3.3 
2.0 
7.0 
2.5 
a
_ estimated j 
Source: Victor Halberstadt and Robert Haveman. 
Here we will examine the determinants of the growth of the number of disa-
bility recipients at a macro level.2 To this end we present a conceptual 
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framework in section two. This framework enables us to estimate the share 
of disability awards in the private sector of the economy which is granted 
solely as a consequence of economic factors. Consequently, the hidden unem-
ployment among disability beneficiaries can be estimated. This is done in 
section three. Finally section four gives some concluding comments. 
2. THE CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
In various studies (Lando (1974), Lando et. al. (1979), Hambor (1975), 
Emanuel, Halberstadt and Petersen (forthcoming)) the importance of economic 
variables, notably the unemployment rate, in explaining the number of disa-
bility recipients has been stressed. We have developed a more extended 
framework by introducing non-economic variables: 
DR = f (H, PH, OS, E, LS) (1) 
where DR stands for the disability incidence rate, i.e. the number of disa-
bility awards per year per 100 insured, H for health, PH for perceived 
state of health, OS for occupational structure, E for economic factors and 
LS for legal structure. 
Other things being equal a worsening of the state of health (H) of the in-
sured population implies a larger number of disabled persons. The perceived 
state of health (PH) reflects the whole set of norms and values with 
respect to whether it is socially and personally acceptable to feel oneself 
entitled to a benefit. It is commonly agreed that this set of norms and 
values changes over time, and can partly explain the increase of the disa-
bility rate.3 As some occupations are of a more physically (e.g. the 
building sector) or of a mentally demanding nature than others, it is obvi-
ous that account should be taken of a possible changed occupational struc-
ture (OS). The economic factors (E) stand for the effects of economic 
determinants on the development of the disability incidence rate. We have 
assumed that the profit-maximizing behavior of employers constitutes a 
suitable basis for analysing the link between economic variables and the 
disability incidence rate. For, given the rigid wage structure, employers 
will be inclined if the need arise to dismiss those employees first who are 
least productive e.g. because they are handicapped (see e.g. van Praag and 
Halberstadt (1980)). Since a disability benefit is generally more attrac-
tive, both financially and from the point of view of social acceptance, 
than an unemployment benefit (at least in the Netherlands), potential unem-
ployed will, if possible, prefer a disability to an unemployment benefit. 
The legal structure (LS), notably criteria governing eligibility and bene-
fit determination, may also contribute to the explanation of the level of 
the disability incidence rate. 
It will be clear that it is difficult to find the appropriate empirical 
counterparts for the explanatory variables introduced above. However, it is 
not necessary to measure each of these variables separately since our anal-
ysis is based on a comparison between the disability incidence rate in the 
private sector and the public sector. According to our framework, any 
numerical difference between the two disability incidence rates must be at-
tributed to different values of the explanatory variables. At first sight, 
the variable (E) differs remarkably between the two sectors. To be precise, 
it can be assumed that profit maximizing behavior of employers is signifi-
cant only for the explanation of the level of the disability incidence rate 
in the private sector. In the public sector arguments other than the profit 
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criterion are used when expansion or contraction of the number of employees 
is considered. Hence the basic idea is to make the disability incidence 
rates in both sectors comparable in such a way that the remaining differ-
ence between the disability incidence rate in the private sector and the 
disability incidence rate in the public sector can be attributed only to 
economic factors. Consequently it will be possible to calculate that part 
of the disability volume in the private sector, which may virtually be con-
sidered as hidden unemployment. 
3. THE APPLICATION TO THE NETHERLANDS 
In this section some basic features of the Dutch Disability Programs will 
be described. Secondly, we will illustrate the application of the frame-
work, and thirdly some results will be presented and discussed. 
A. The Dutch Disability Programs 
In the Netherlands employees in the private sector receive a benefit under 
the Sickness Benefit Act during the first year of disability because of 
illness or accident. After one year of disability the Disability Security 
Act (DSA), introduced July 1967, comes into effect. Depending on the degree 
of disability the DSA benefit amounts to a maximum of 80% of the previous 
earnings up to an income ceiling. There is no maximum benefit duration. The 
required minimum degree of disability is only 15%. As aging is usually cor-
related with a worsening state of health, this means that especially the 
older employees will rather easily meet this el igibility criterion. 
Besides, by the determination of the benefit percentage not only the health 
status counts, but also the reduced chance on the labour market because of 
the handicap must be taken into account (see for a discussion of this e.g. 
van de Water (1979) and, with respect to the Netherlands, Emanuel (1981)). 
Employees in the public sector are covered by a separate disability scheme. 
The only difference between this scheme and the DSA is the period between 
the first day of absence and the moment when a disability is awarded (the 
so-called waiting period). In in the public sector this waiting period is 
variable, because only when it is almost certain that the disability will 
be permanent is a disability benefit awarded. 
In 1968 the disability incidence rates in the private and the public sector 
amounted to 1.1% resp. 0.5%. Both rates have increased rapidly and reached 
in 1980 the level of 2.2% and 1.3% respectively. 
B. The application of the conceptual framework 
In the following the explanatory variables of the disability incidence rate 
are discussed for the Netherlands. Our aim is to isolate the variables that 
are on the one hand responsible for the growth of the disability incidence 
rate in the both sectors and on the other for the discrepancy between them. 
The development of the state of health (H) is, because of a lack of more 
appropriate data, approached by the development of mortality rates (see for 
a similar approach Doherty (1979) and Parsons (1980)). These mortality 
rates (standardized for age and sex) have, in the considered period, 
slightly improved. Because in addition the average age of both insured pop-
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ulations has somewhat declined, we must conclude that the state of health 
does not contribute to the explanation of the rise of the disability inci-
dence rate in either the private or the public sector. To eliminate the in-
fluence of different age structures of the insured populations of both sec-
tors on the respective incidence rates, we have made both rates comparable 
by standardizing for age. 5 
Appropriate data about the second variable, the perceived state of health 
(PH) are difficult to obtain. We will return to this shortly. It is however 
plausible that the gradual evolution of this attitude is an overall social 
phenomenon and has thereby contributed to the increase of the disability 
incidence rate in both sectors in the same way. 
Because in the period under consideration the occupational structure (OS) 
has not significantly changed in either the private or public sector, this 
variable does not contribute to the explanation of the increase in the dis-
ability incidence rate.6 However, the difference in the occupational struc-
ture between the private and public sector can partly explain the differ-
ence between the disability incidence rates in both sectors, since the 
average occupation in the private sector is thought to be of a more de-
manding nature as far as health conditions are concerned. The estimated 
correction factor which' eliminates this influence decreases the disability 
incidence rate of the private sector only slightly.7 This is in accordance 
with an analysis of the disability incidence rate per occupation, where it 
has been found that the difference in the disability incidence rates per 
occupation keeping economic factors constant, can largely be explained by 
different age structures of the occupational groups.8 
As was pointed in section 2, economic factors (E) are only significant for 
the explanation of the disability incidence rate in the private sector.9 As 
we already mentioned above, the longer waiting period in the public sector 
is the only significant difference between the legal structures (LS) of the 
two sectors.10 To make the disability incidence rates of the two sectors 
comparable with respect to this variable, we have to take account of the 
number of people in the public sector whose disability lasts longer than 
one year, but who are not awarded a disability benefit because the disabil-
ity is clearly temporary. We have estimated a correction factor to 
eliminate this difference. 
Finally, it should be remarked that no evidence has been found that other 
factors are substantial in explaining either the increase in both disabili-
ty incidence rates, or the discrepancy between the disability incidence 
rates in the two sectors. 
Summing up, the above implies that only the changed perceived state of 
health (PH) and the development of the economic variables (E) are consid-
ered to be the prime factors in explaining the increase of the disability 
incidence rate in the private sector. The only factor held responsible for 
the growth of the disability incidence rate in the public sector is the 
changed perceived state of health. 
We have tested these findings with regression analysis for the period 1968-
1980. The disability incidence rate in the private sector (DR1) is ex-
plained by the disability incidence rate in the public sector (DR2), as a 
proxy for the change in the perceived state of health (PH) - as mentioned 
above an overall societal phenomenon - and the real labor cost per unit of 
output (LCUO). This last variable, which has steadily increased in the pe-
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riod under consideration, is assumed to be a proxy variable for the econom-
ic factors (E). It is assumed that as LCUO increases, which implies that 
real wages increase faster than labor productivity, the average profitabil-
ity of employees decreases (see also Morley, 1979). By implication the 
least productive employees, such as the handicapped, will be the first to 
be confronted with the possibility of dismissal. In this situation these 
employees will be inclined to apply for a disability benefit. 
The first equation of table 2 shows that the empirical findings are in ac-
cordance with the theoretical setting because both DR2 and LCUO have the 
expected signs and are statistically significant. Another way to test the 
model is with the so called economic disability incidence rate in the pri-
vate sector (EDR1). This rate is defined as the difference between the dis-
ability incidence rate in the private sector (corrected for OS) and the 
disability incidence rate in the public sector (corrected for LS and the 
difference with respect to the age distribution). Consequently we get an 
estimation of that part of the disability incidence rate in the private 
sector which is solely related to economic factors. Equation (2) in table 2 
shows that the relationship between EDR1 and LCUO is statistically signifi-
cant too. The remaining two equations try to explain EDR1 by unemployment 
rates. Equation (3) contains the official unemployment rate (U) as explana-
tory variable. Anticipating of the results presented below, equation (4) 
Table 2. Estimates of the disability rate model (1968-1980). 
Independent 
Variable 
Intercept 
DR2t 
LCUOt-1 
Ut-1 
UHUt.1 
I2 
S.E. 
D.W. 
(1) 
DRlt 
-2.201 
(-2.14) 
0.866 
(3.23) 
0.028 
(2.61) 
0.920 
0.104 
1.818 
Dependent 
(2) 
EDRlt 
-1.772 
(-3.25) 
0.024 
(4.92) 
0.681 
0.101 
1.648 
Variable 
(3) 
EDRlt 
0.655 
(7.21) 
0.074 
(3.02) 
0.405 
0.133 
1.071 
(4) 
EDRlt 
0.677 
(11.24) 
0.043 
(4.40) 
0.607 
0.108 
1.271 
Note: The t-values are shown in parentheses. 
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shows the results if U includes the hidden unemployment among disability 
beneficiaries. This gives the much higher unemployment rate UHU. It appears 
that UHU explains a larger proportion of the total variation in EDR1 in 
comparison with U. This can be explained by the fact that the official 
unemployment rate is an underestimation of the development of unemployment. 
C. The method of calculation and some results 
The method can be explained as follows. For each year we have calculated 
the economic disability incidence rate. Multiplying this rate by the number 
of insured yields the annual number of disability awards for economic rea-
sons, the so-called hidden unemployment. Next, the total volume of hidden 
unemployment can be calculated on the basis of some assumptions with 
respect to termination pattern of hidden unemployed.12 The cumulated result 
is a volume of about 200,000 man-years of hidden unemployment in 1980. This 
equals 43% of the total volume of disability beneficiaries (also expressed 
in manyear) in the private sector.13 Table 3 shows the importance of these 
findings by relating hidden unemployment to officially registered unemploy-
ment. It appears that the official unemployment rate considerably underes-
timates the development of unemployment. 
Table 3. Hidden unemployment and officially registered 
unemployment rate, (The Netherlands, 1968-1981). 
1968 1974 1980 1981a 
(1) Hidden unemploy-
ment among DSA 0.3 2.7 4.7 4.9 
beneficiaries" 
(2) Officially regis-
tered unemploy- 1.9 3.3 5.6 6.5 
mentD»c 
(3) Total unemploy-
ment 2.2 6.0 10.3 11.4 
(3) = (1) + (2) 
d
 Projection is based on the assumption that the disability rates 
remain at their 1980 level and that the insured populaton remains 
constant. 
b Expressed as a percentage of the labor force. 
c
 These data are based on: Central Economic Plan 1980, and Macro-
economic Projections 1981 (1980), Central Planning Bureau, The 
Hague (in Dutch). 
4. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
It is commonly agreed that the worsening economic conditions have posi-
tively influenced the number of disability beneficiaries. It is therefore 
resonable to conjecture that there may be hidden unemployment among the 
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disability beneficiaries. In this paper we have developed as a first 
approach a conceptual framework to examine this influence. We have applied 
this framework to the Dutch Disability schemes and have found a consid-
erable volume of hidden unemployment among disability beneficiaries. This 
means that the disability program partly fulfils the function of an unem-
ployment scheme. Consequently a trade-off between unemployment and disabil-
ity arises. 
It follows that, to a considerable extent, disability is becoming an eco-
nomic phenomenon. Like other results of research pertaining to the social 
security system, see e.g. Martin Feldstein (1978), this must have implica-
tions for the optimal redesign of social insurance. 
FOOTNOTES 
*) Erasmus University Rotterdam. The authors wish to thank Victor 
Halberstadt, Joop Hartog, Pieter Korteweg, and Dick Wolfson for their com-
ments on an earlier draft of this paper. Further we are endebted to 
Christina Jonung for comments on a draft of this paper during the Arne Ryde 
Symposium, and to an anonymous referee who provided important suggestions. 
1) See for more data Victor Halberstadt and Robert Haveman, (forthcom-
ing), International Labour Office (1979), Social Security Administration 
(1980). 
2) See for an explanation of the growth of the volume of disability bene-
ficiaries per branch of industry, which differs remarkably, at least in the 
Netherlands, van den Bosch and Petersen (1982) and (1983). 
3) This will be due to both a learning process and the fact that as the 
volume of beneficiaries increases the stigma attaching to the status of 
beneficiary usually decreases, see Lando (1974) and Schechter (1981). 
4) See also Levy, (1980), especially p. 13. 
5) The average age in the public sector is approximately 5 years higher 
than in the private sector. By standardizing with the age distribution of 
the private sector the disability incidence rate in the public sector de-
crease about 30%. See for further details of this and the following correc-
tion factors: van den Bosch and Petersen (1979). 
6) Assuming that jobs in the service sector are of a less demanding na-
ture as far as health conditions are concerned, the slightly increased 
share of employment in the service sector with respect to total private 
sector employment means that this could have a negative influence on the 
private sector disability incidence rate leading to an underestimation of 
the results reported below. Furthermore, there is no indication available 
that the type of work per branch of industry was on the average more de-
manding in 1980 than it was in 1968. See also van den Bosch and Petersen 
(1982). 
7) The calculaton of this correction factor is based on data pertaining 
to injury at work and industrial disease. This correction lowers the disa-
bility incidence rate in the private sector by 0.05 percent. 
8) This analysis was entirely based on data pertaining to the disability 
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incidence rate by occupation within the public sector. Consequently ac-
cording to our assumptions the effect of economic factors on the disability 
incidence rate per occupation is nil. 
9) If the awarding of public sector disability benefits is to some extent 
influenced by economic factors (e.g. by measures reducing the budget), this 
could lead to an underestimation of our results. 
10) It has to be remarked that the variable PH also incorporates the ef-
fects of a possible change of the implicit eligibility criteria used by the 
awarding boards of both sectors, due to social trends with respect to so-
cial and personal acceptability to feel oneself entitled to a benefit. 
11) This correction factor is based on an estimation of the number of DSA 
awards, of which the duration of the disability status was only temporary. 
Consequently the remaining number of DSA awards is permanent and thus com-
parable with the public sector awards. For the sake of convenience, we have 
applied this correction factor to the disability incidence rate in the pub-
lic sector, (increasing this rate with approximately 30%). 
12) We have assumed that the termination percentages (T) of hidden unem-
ployment equal the overall termination percentages. We can illustrate the 
method of calculation as follows. Let HU^(t) the hidden unemployment in the 
year (t) among persons who received an award in year (i), i = vintage 1968, 
1969 ; t = 1968, 1969 ; HU (t) the total hidden unemployment 
in year (t); EDR1 the economic disability incidence rate; IP the number of 
DSA-insured; T (t) the percentage of the initial awards whose benefit has 
been terminated (t) years after entry. So we can define: 
(1) HU-j(t) = EDRl-j .IP-j_i. (100 - r(t)) 
(2) HU (t) = Z HU,(t). 
i=1968 n 
13) This means that we have estimated the capacity of work of the total 
number of disability beneficiaries. It follows that 200,000 man-years cor-
responds with a considerable higher number of partial hidden unemployed 
persons. 
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